Shane
Tomashot
Medvedev-Let
History Judge
(pp.
ix-xxxiv, 3-191)
Let History Judge: The Origins
and Consequences of Stalinism is Roy Medvedev’s magnum opus, and perhaps
the most popular and highly praised biography of Josef Stalin and his era of
totalitarian rule. Medvedev’s vast
undertaking began in the 1950’s, and he shared drafts with friends and
colleagues by the early 1960’s. By 1969,
he published the book abroad. His
motivation in writing a biography not only of Stalin, but of “the
socio-political and economic conditions and social groups of which he based
himself,” stemmed from “a rehabilitation of Stalin” in Soviet society and
politics in 1969 and again in 1985 (p. xvii).
The book, after numerous releases and rewrites, is the epitome of
scholarly research on Stalin and his times. Medvedev turns the propaganda laden legacy of
Stalinism on its head. Although he does
not utilize privileged archives or secret sources, Medvedev exposes Stalin’s
atrocities as well as the psychological composition of the man.
Likening
Stalinism to a “disease” infecting Soviet society, Medvedev’s introduction
explains the attempts to rehabilitate Stalinism in 1969 as well as in
1985. Not until 1986, Medvedev states, did
the first criticisms of Stalin appear in Russian culture. Numerous films, books, magazines and plays
attacked Stalinism and totalitarianism, pointing out crimes and
atrocities. Such artistic ventures were
also created from the 1920’s through the 1970’s, but were stamped out by the
Communist Party or Stalin himself (except for a brief period under Khrushchev
in the 1960’s). In 1987, Gorbachev spoke
openly of Stalin’s crimes and abuse of power.
By 1988, Perestroika and Glasnost paved the way for “change”
(restructure) and “openness” (voice) in Soviet society. Textbooks were rewritten and open discussion
of the Communist Party became more permissible and prevalent.
At
the 1988 writing of his introduction, Medvedev points out the plethora of
problems that continue to consume Soviet society. Two generations of Russians have known only
the propagandized Stalin, proclaiming him a military hero, savvy politician,
and shrewd statesman. Moreover, the
Soviet Supreme Court is still unable to exonerate Bukharin, Rykov and other
falsely condemned socialists due to its lack of independence. Medvedev, still an ardent socialist as of
1988, proclaims Glasnost must be used to “rehabilitate Leninism” and tell the
true stories of Lenin’s associates.
Medvedev
explores Stalin’s childhood and his eventual rise to power within the Bolshevik
Party in his first chapter. A Georgian,
Stalin developed into a cold, crude and unsentimental individual with an overly
ambitious personality (p. 27). His
father was a negative influence and his mother was rarely around, working
numerous jobs. Stalin did not even
attend her funeral, despite the fact that it is a sacred ritual highly regarded
in Georgian culture. Furthermore,
Stalin’s personality became more dour with the death of his first wife in
1909.
Stalin
became a revolutionary while in seminary.
He was well-read, but lacked oratorical skills (“He was booed off the
platform at a meeting of Georgian railroad workers” in 1923, p. 66). Classmates found him rather dogmatic, humorless,
agnostic, and very untrustworthy of his fellow man. In the late 1890’s, Stalin joined a Georgian
socialist group and became an avid reader of Marx and Engels. By 1901, he was a “Transcaucasian activist,” organizing
worker strikes and demonstrations.
Although Stalin’s level of activism during the 1905 Revolution is
disputed, Medvedev contends Stalin “took part in many events” although he
“preferred not to operate in the foreground” (p. 31). Stalin organized numerous terrorist acts
(expropriations) following the 1905 Revolution, including a large bank heist in
the southern caucus.
By
1907, Stalin had gained Lenin’s attention after participating in larger worker
strikes in Baku. Stalin challenged
Lenin’s writings and beliefs during this time, especially Lenin’s attempts to
nationalize land and abolish private ownership.
By 1913, some of Stalin’s writings “made a very good impression on
Lenin” (pp. 32-33). By 1915, however,
Lenin actually forgot “Koba’s” last name due to the irregularity of contact
between the socialist revolutionaries.
Stalin
was banished to Siberia in 1913 for his political activities. Fellow political exiles found him very
confrontational and egotistical. Writing
later, Trotsky stated that Stalin “accomplished nothing intellectual” during
his exile, despite the fact that such isolation was a perfect situation in
which to write and study in Trotsky’s mind.
Stalin did attempt on numerous occasions to escape his confinement. He frequently wrote to fellow Bolsheviks
asking for money for food, intending to actually use the money for his
getaway.
Following
his term in a Siberian Gulag, The Bolshevik Committee formed in Petrograd in
March 1917. The committee voted to give
Koba “only a consulting vote,” in relation to setting an agenda, due to “certain
personal characteristics” (p. 41).
Stalin’s seniority in the party, however, got him on the editorial board
of Pravda, where he was able to write
and maneuver himself politically. He
essentially became the de-facto head of the Petrograd Bolsheviks in Lenin’s
absence. In this capacity, Stalin became
well-known for his great skill in organization.
Stalin, along with Sverdlov, brought a “military order” to the
Bolsheviks. Stalin made personal
political alliances within the party and continued to challenge Lenin’s
writings (pp. 45-47).
Pro-Stalin
propaganda of the 1930’s made him out to be an organizer and hero of the
October 1917 “uprising.” Medvedev labels
such information a fabrication, as the record is void of any contributions or
participation by Stalin. Following the
October Revolution, Stalin, because of his past writings as well as his
political connections, was named the First Head of the Commissariat of the
Nationality Division. He took part in
the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk negotiations and communicated with Ukrainian
revolutionaries, contradicting Lenin’s orders to the Ukrainian socialist
leadership. Stalin, however, voted with
Lenin in ending Russia’s participation in The Great War.
Stalin’s
Civil War participation, Medvedev indicates, is also rife with propaganda. Millions of Russian students were taught of
Stalin’s great military leadership of the Red Army during the Civil War. In reality, while Trotsky organized the Red
Army, Stalin was in charge of the military in the Taritsyn Region and
eventually the entire northern Caucus.
He “maintained order and control through terror,” killing suspected
counter-revolutionaries and fellow Soviet military specialists alike. He manipulated outgoing information of
military defeats and setbacks to make it appear as if military generals were to
blame for his often poor judgment of military matters. However, Stalin’s political maneuvering and
alliances placed him in a strong position within the party vis-à-vis Lenin, and
hence permitted Stalin to defy Lenin’s orders on many occasions.
“Lenin’s
attitude toward Stalin was benevolent in the years 1918-1921.” Lenin even “half-joking, half-serious” asked
Stalin to marry his younger sister (p. 67).
Lenin defended Stalin in the face of criticism from fellow
Bolsheviks. Lenin would not be hostile
toward Stalin, according to Medvedev, until after the Eleventh Congress. By 1922, Stalin was named General Secretary
of the Central Committee mostly because of his organization skills. This by no means, Medvedev claims, meant that
Stalin was regarded as the heir apparent to Lenin. However, Stalin was able to now actively
place sycophants and other Stalinists into regional and key party
positions. Moreover, Lenin’s physical condition
in late 1922 was deteriorating rapidly.
Following
Lenin’s death, Stalin’s top priority was “maneuvering skillfully among the
various platforms and tendencies” making “use of the conflict among factions in
the party to weaken all his rivals and increase his own power and authority”
(p. 93). Stalin did not work to convince
his opponents to his side of the argument as did Lenin. Rather, Stalin “sought to break their
resistance and subject them to his will.”
Stalin became “extremely vengeful,” resorting to name calling and
personal insults. He held “grudges” with
his perceived enemies “even when the issue in dispute had faded away and
harmonious collaboration was imperative” (p. 95).
Medvedev paints an excellent picture of
Bukharin and Trotsky, analyzing their rise through the party, their relationship
with Lenin and their connections to his ultimate falling out with Stalin. The so called evidence of Trotsky’s deceit
and betrayal to the party provided to Soviet audiences beginning in the 1930’s
through the 1970’s were a product of Stalin’s cultish propaganda machine. Lenin, at least by the time of the Russian
Civil War, had more confidence and faith in Trotsky than in Stalin.
Trotsky
became very popular following the Civil War, with his name appearing in songs
and his portrait with Lenin on the walls of Soviet institutions (p. 109). Trotsky missed an important opportunity to
block Stalin’s power, as history would show, when he did not fulfill Lenin’s
request to speak at the Twelfth Party Congress.
Had he read Lenin’s letters to the Congress, he could have likely
convinced the congress to vote against Stalin’s appointment as General
Secretary and hence remove Stalin from the political power equation.
Stalin
was able to use Trotsky’s own words against him. Stalin published statements by
Trotsky attacking Lenin from 1903 to 1916, before Lenin and Trotsky became
close allies. With the help of allies
put in place some years prior, Stalin was able to strong arm the Trotskyites
from the Central Committee. By 1929,
Trotsky lost his battle with the Stalin faction (as well as the rightists) and
was deported. His allies were arrested
“and placed in special isolation prisons for political offenders” (p. 176). In 1932, Zinoviev and Kamenev were dealt the
same fate.
Medvedev’s
book is an excellent read for scholars of Soviet Russia and armchair historians
alike. His detail of the major
characters that played a role in Stalin’s rise to power is remarkable,
especially considering the sources available and risks involved. The details of Stalin’s formative years are
well researched and lucid. Medvedev,
however, as an admitted Leninist, does not point out Lenin’s own atrocious
acts. It seems rather odd that Medvedev,
who had to write his book in fear for his own and his brother’s well-being,
would be so supportive of the individual that created the oppressive party that
sequestered him. Although he mostly
blames Stalin for Russia’s totalitarianism, it seems he would question the past
actions of the party under Lenin as well.
Regardless, and although this review covers only a fourth of the book,
it is clear that Medvedev’s narrative is a wealth of information that leaves
plenty for historians to research and ponder for future generations.
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