Shane Tomashot
Fitzpatrick—Stalin’s
Peasants
Sheila Fitzpatrick’s ironically
titled tome Stalin’s Peasants: Resistance and Survival in the Russian
Village after Collectivization, delves deeply into the pre-collective and
collective rural society of the Soviet Union under the rule of Stalin’s
totalitarian dictatorship of the 1930’s.
Fitzpatrick’s array of anecdotes brings to life the peasant resistance
to the kolkhoz system as well as the struggles of Soviet officials to implement
Stalin’s commands. Stalin’s
collectivization of the countryside was initially viewed by the peasantry as
neo-serfdom. Over the course of the
decade, however, peasants saw that the arbitrary collectivization was more of
an attempt to eradicate peasant social identity and tradition. The kolkhoz was created to exploit peasant
labor and commandeer agricultural resources.
The peasantry paid the ultimate price, especially the kulak class (and
anyone arbitrarily labeled as a kulak), with their lives. Although peasants traditionally identified
with their own Mir rather than Russia, collectivization gave them the common
bond of outright resistance. They worked
to make the kolkhoz serve their purpose rather than that of the state.
“Stalin’s peasants” actually detested
Stalin. Fitzpatrick’s discussion of the
“Potemkin Village” illustrates the vast divide between the authorities and the
peasantry. The idealized, utopian
village of the Soviet establishment and the propaganda showing a peasant class
that revered comrade Stalin was the “antithesis” of Soviet social reality. The common peasant saying “no food on the
table, but Stalin on the wall,” was indicative of peasant struggles and
frustration with the government, as well as their direct (and accurate) blame
of Stalin for their ills. Show trials in
which peasants vented true misfortunes and crimes, were used by the communists
only as a propaganda tool rather than a remedy.
Even Stalin’s “conciliatory” and “ingratiating gestures,” such as
offering maternity leave for workers and his “warm public appearances,” were
met with suspicion by peasants (p. 290-291).
Peasants even rejoiced at Kirov’s murder, viewed by many as a moderate,
simply because he was a member of the Communist Party.
Peasant opposition to
collectivization evolved from one of active resistance to passive
resistance. Subaltern strategies
included “foot-dragging, failure to understand instructions, refusal to take
the initiative and pilfering” (p. 5). The
state’s ruthless oppression of uprisings prevented violent upheaval in the
countryside. Over the course of the
1930’s, peasant resistance became one of “active accommodation,” in which the
peasants could join the system rather than attempt to beat it. Fitzpatrick raises the question of whether or
not this is “Sovietization” or the peasantry actually buying into the
system. Peasants could fill the role of
kolkhoz officeholder, machine operator for the local MTS, or work toward
“Stakhanovism.” Of course, joining the
system was a dangerous venture, despite the perks, as the central authority was
known to use its officials as scapegoats should a collective fail to meet its
quota. Moreover, Stakhanovism, in which
a peasant works above and beyond what is expected, only raised expectations for
the rest of the kolkhozniks. Often, this
led to persecution of the stakhanovite (typically a woman) by the other
villagers. As Fitzpatrick makes clear,
the state initiated a forced collectivization that the peasantry never
accepted.
Moreover, many peasants left the
countryside for the cities. Over twelve
million peasants left their villages in the early 1930’s to become wage
earners, exacerbated by the first five year plan in 1929 (p. 80). Some left to find work on state farms rather
than in the kolkhoz. This large loss of
young males demoralized villages and thus made them less likely to physically
protest collectivization. Most kulaks,
whether they were deported or left of their own accord, ended up working in
industries.
Rebellion or refusal to conform to the system
was fraught with danger. The Bolsheviks feared
the NEP would create “nascent capitalists” in the Mirs. This became the “fulcrum of their fears” (p.
33). During the dekulakization period
(initiated by Stalin in December 1929), millions of peasants, whether they were
classified as bedniaks (poor peasants), seredniaks (middle peasants), or
kulaks, faced the danger of Siberian banishment. Although only three percent of Russian
society was kulak by 1930, Soviet officials deported millions due to fears of
capitalism permeating the Mirs. Kulak
status was convoluted within the Mir.
Kulaks were respected, yet envied for their perceived wealth. Dekulakization was frightening in its
randomness, but peasants were indifferent overall, Fitzpatrick contends.
Collectivization officials were
“outsiders” who knew little about farming according to peasants. The Politburo’s “gigantomania” in relation to
collectivization left the concept in a state of oblivion. Although Stalin never specified what
collectivization meant, the central government sent out quotas that were to be
met in each raion, which then set down the quota in each kolkhoz. Officials had to meet quotas or face
persecution. Moreover, meeting an annual
quota often meant an increase in the next quota. The regime was purposefully nonspecific in
its requests under collectivization, Fitzpatrick contends, in order to get
“local cadres pushing for the absolute maximum” (p. 49). This often led to hysteria in the countryside
as officials used any means necessary to acquire goods while committing
numerous crimes against the kolkhozniks.
In the early 1930’s, kolkhoz administrators got away with numerous
crimes such as rape and theft. By the
time of the Purges of 1937, however, officials were punished for violating the
capricious “kolkhoz democracy” or the kolkhoz charter (p. 195).
Official drives to eliminate
religion typically led to theological unification of the peasantry, Fitzpatrick
contends (Fitzpatrick also makes clear, however, that collectivization caused
“intense feuding” within the village communities). Komosol gangs stormed churches and
vandalized church property. Priests were
treated as kulaks. Returning Red Army
soldiers proclaimed themselves atheist, while peasant marriages were
increasingly carried out in civic institutions rather than in the Orthodox
Church. Religious persecution, however,
increased peasant resolve to resist collectivization. Resistance became religiously symbolic. Peasants carried out congregations in the
homes of church members after priests were purged. “The distinction between Orthodox and Old
Believers was losing its meaning in some places” (p. 205). Religious sects were increasing in the
villages and peasants turned to “sectarian slogans” over Communist propaganda.
The 1930’s witnessed a countryside
rife with hysteria. Peasant class
tensions were exacerbated by the uncertainty of collectivization rules, the
raiding Komosol thugs, incongruent government policies, and corrupt regional
officials. Peasants were forced to
choose whether or not they were for or “against Soviet power.” Officials continued with dekulakization, while
peasants lynched Komosol and Soviet officials.
Many peasants viewed collectivization as evil and the coming of the
Apocalypse. “Why sow if the end of the
world is coming soon?,” peasants often asked (p. 47). Peasants awaited a rumored German invasion,
believing that the Germans would eliminate the collective system. Of course, German occupation bore a striking
resemblance to Stalinism.
The Purges, which had their greatest
impact on the urban population, hindered an already obfuscated system. Purged bosses purged subordinates. The number of registered party members by
district decreased while “rural cadres were in a state of panic” (p. 198). Fitzpatrick indicates the level of turnover
stating that by “the end of 1937,” nearly half of the “kolkhoz chairmen,
brigade leaders, and heads of kolkhoz commercial farms had been on the job for
less than a year” (p. 199). Show trials
were used to show the “crimes” of officials and address real peasant
grievances, but accomplished little in fixing the situation.
Fitzpatrick’s book exposes the clash
between the onset of forced collectivization and the long-held traditions of
peasant society. Stalin was indeed
“Peasant Enemy No. 1” not only in the eyes of objective historians, but in the
eyes of the peasants over which he ruled (p. 296). Peasants viewed collectivization as not only
a rebirth of serfdom, but a renewed means of exploitation. They molded Kolkhoz collectivization to fit
their needs (with the exception of state procurement of horses). They were able to maintain some semblance of
village autonomy and identity despite Communist attempts to shatter peasant
tradition and custom. The only real
criticism of Fitzpatrick’s work, which she admits, is that many of her
anecdotes come from limited sources.
Still, this work is an encyclopedia of information on the struggles of
collectivization in Stalinist Russia.
Fitzpatrick’s work is a foundation for any study of Russian peasant
society in the 1930’s.
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