Shane Tomashot
Harding Book Review
Lenin’s
Political Thought Vol. 2—Neil Harding
Neil
Harding’s goal, in his book Lenin’s Political Thought, Volume 2: Theory and
Practice in the Socialist Revolution, is to challenge and ultimately
dismiss the notion that Lenin was simply a power hungry, calculating politician
who used Marxism as only a pretext to dictatorial rule. Harding’s well documented study is almost
apologetic for Lenin’s failures, blaming circumstance and the convoluted
theorizing of Marx and Engels on Lenin’s shortcomings. In the end, however, Harding does effectively
defend his thesis and accomplishes his goal of giving the reader a better
understanding of Lenin’s writings so we may see Lenin as a theory driven leader
whose political maneuverings were theory driven, rather than a power seeking
venture under the guise of communism.
Harding
contends that Lenin is more regarded by historians as a genius organizer and
political actor than as a theorist of Marxism.
This contention is turned on its head by Harding, who deems Lenin “an
extraordinarily doctrinaire politician,” perhaps the most doctrinaire of the
twentieth century (p. 3). A doctrinaire
politician, in Harding’s estimation (although it is not directly defined in the
book) is one who makes decisions based on data, careful analysis and
theorizing. Lenin, like Marx, believed
that “if reality is out of line with theory, so much the worse for
reality.” Lenin was, in effect, driven
by analytical theory.
The Great
War had a major impact on Lenin’s theoretical beliefs. His writings on the war, according to
Harding’s argument, give clear evidence that Lenin was indeed dedicated to
theory. Lenin believed the war was
simply a manifestation of corrupt capitalism/imperialism (nearly one in the
same to Lenin) in its final stages. All
nations, according to Lenin, were “sleeping on a volcano” of socialist magma
ready to ignite into socialist revolution (p. 36). The war itself was “bourgeois chauvinism
under the guise of patriotism” as the controllers of wealth (banks, corrupt
politicians, etc.) tried to bury emerging class conflicts and struggles with so
called patriotic duty (p. 18). Lenin saw
a fundamental imbalance between the agricultural and machine industry sectors
of production, which was, in Marxist thought, a certain sign of pending social
crisis.
Lenin’s
book, Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism, not only captured his
theoretical approach, but also served as a call to action. Written in 1916, it claimed that Europe and
Russia were ripe for a Marxist revolution.
His masterwork sought to convince fence sitting Marxists to commit to
revolution. Lenin was convinced, after
thorough research and analysis, that capitalism had reached its apogee and had
become parasitic. Lenin believed that
“socialism is now gazing at us from all the windows of modern capitalism” (p.
75). In this opinion, Harding indicates,
Lenin stood alone among fellow Marxists.
After
February of 1917, if Lenin were the calculating, power-seeking politician or
dictator some historians paint him, he would have joined with the Bolsheviks
“in the horse trading that was going on” in order to gain majority power in the
Provisional Government, Harding contends (p. 83). Lenin did not believe in party politics per
se, as he even had disdain for the Labour Party of Britain. Even though it had a proletariat connotation,
the party “was irredeemable bourgeois in its politics” (p. 242). The individual leaders of the party and the
theories underlying their actions were most important to Lenin.
Circumventing party politics, Lenin
immersed himself in Marxist theory, academically studying “Marx and Engels on
the question of state.” Lenin debated
questions such as: what is to become of the state? How would the masses exercise their
power? Would there be a transitional
period? Lenin also had fundamental
disagreements with fellow Marxist Bukharin, who was more of an anarchist.
Harding
becomes apologetic for Lenin at this juncture.
Harding concludes that because Engels and Marx vacillated on their definition
of state, they “bequeathed” the “problem of state” upon Lenin. Harding goes out of his way to blame Lenin’s
failures not on his own theorizing or timing, but, rather, upon the flaws
inherent in the writings and theorizing of Engels and Marx. Harding states that Lenin’s slogans of
anarchy in late 1917 were not “opportunistic” as some historians have claimed,
but actually a part of his theoretical writings based upon Marxism.
Harding
believes that Lenin’s ideas make sense only if we view them in relation to his
economic ideas. Harding does a fine job
here of providing evidence to this thesis.
Leninist theory, Harding contends, is based upon Lenin’s deep thoughts
and analysis of the economic substructure of society, the levels of development
of the country’s productive forces and the corresponding level of development
of the social classes. Lenin’s first
great work, The development of Capitalism in Russia, written in 1899,
reveals his deep and inclusive knowledge of capitalism, economics and society.
To
understand Leninist thought, Harding states, one must distinguish between
theory and practice. Lenin’s tactical
alterations and organizational form were based upon his examination of
capitalism. He saw capitalism in phases,
wherein each phase required its own Marxist reaction. Moreover, each phase had to be completed
while at the same time exhibiting aspects (or symptoms, perhaps) of the next
stage. Hence, a knowledgeable Marxist
had “to see the future in the present” since each stage required its own set of
objectives, organizational form and struggles (p. 312). Lenin’s call for revolution occurred only
after his own careful analysis of the banking system and its economic grip on
society, his reading of Marx’s account of the Paris Commune, and the creation
of the soviets following the February Revolution.
Harding
states that Lenin did not seek power.
Rather, he called upon the Russian people to “take their” land,
factories and power. Furthermore, Lenin
called for the disillusion of the state
into soviets and communes. At this
point, however, as he later admitted, he made his greatest error. Lenin did not call for a transitory phase.
Finally,
Harding also points out the fundamental flaws in Lenin’s approach. Lenin overestimated the timing of when the
imperialist powers were actually ripe for Marxist revolution. This was a key flaw, as true Marxism required
worldwide communist revolution. Lenin
also did not realize the abundance of aid necessary to put Russia on a path to
socialism. Harding claims that Lenin
fell into a trap warned by Engels: “we do not know the real socio-economic gaps
that exist nor whether they are widening or closing” (p. 321). Lenin’s dictatorship of the proletariat was a
reaction to these flaws. Although it was
meant to be only temporary, the bureaucracy created consumed Lenin’s hopes for
pure socialism.
Harding
accomplishes his mission of exonerating Lenin from the dictatorial and cunning
politician prism of which he is often cast by historians, at least for the
period prior to 1918. Harding provides
an abundance of evidence showing Lenin as a true Marxist and deep thinker whose
actions were based on theory and analysis rather than cunning avarice. At the same time, Harding becomes an
apologist for Lenin, blaming Lenin’s failures on his Marxist contemporaries and
ancestors. We do not see direct
criticism of Lenin until late in the book on the topic of the Kronstadt
Rebellion. One could argue that perhaps
Lenin is to blame for choosing a flawed economic and social theory. Moreover, perhaps Lenin, despite his decades
of deep analysis and theorizing, was eventually consumed by the allure of power
as so many leaders of the past.
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