Shane
Tomashot
Review-Hildermeier
Manfred
Hildermeier, in his book The Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party Before
the First World War, provides an in depth and detailed analysis of the
Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party (PSR), especially in relation to its
greatest adversary, the Bolsheviks and other Social Democrats (SDs). The key contention, he finds, was over the
concept of capitalism versus socialism.
The PSR, although facing its own internal divisions, believed that the
best means for carrying out the revolution was to immediately transition to
socialism. This was in opposition to the
SDs, especially the Bolsheviks, who believed Russia needed a “complete
development of capitalism after the Western European model,” prior to a
transition to socialism (communism).
Hildermeier’s main thesis, what he terms a “paradox,” asks: “why was the
neo-populist movement defeated in one of the largest agricultural countries in
the world?” Through an analysis of the
PSR’s tactics and organization, Hildermeier finds that the PSR failed not only
due to the divide between the intelligentsia and the masses, but because it
simply failed to adjust to a modernizing Russia.
Hildermeier begins with a focus on
the historical development of the PSR as well as the origination of the rifts
between Social Revolutionaries and Social Democrats. The revolutionary movement was originally
divided between northern and southern coalitions. The contentious issues included the use of
terrorism as a tactic and the question of whether or not the peasantry was
prepared for the initiation of socialist revolution. The neo-populist movement was divided from
the outset. Some Social Revolutionaries
such as Argunov believed that the party should seek “agitation among the
industrial proletariat” as they were the “most enlightened stratum” and most
apt to “socialist influence” (p. 34). Southern
SRs, conversely, called for “immediate agitation among the agrarian
population.” This latter position,
Hildermeier contends, became the main fulcrum of SR theory of class and
revolution. It would especially be
pressed forward by Chernov. The SRs felt
their theories of a unified peasantry were confirmed by the peasant unrest of
1902.
SR struggles with the notion of
justified terrorism is the topic of the first half of Hildermeier’s second
chapter. Radical groups such as the
Narodnaia Volia believed that social revolution was impossible without
political revolution. Political
revolution was only possible, according to their theory, if the Tsar was
removed from power through assassination.
Hence, Tsar Alexander II was assassinated by Narodnaia Volia
conspirators in 1881. Terrorists were to
be revered within the revolutionary framework as the terrorist “embodied the
ethical principle of the revolution because he was prepared to give his life
for the revolution” (p. 55). PSR
leadership of the early 20th century, especially Gershuni and
Chernov, worked to validate and justify the use of kalocagathia terrorist acts. “Revolutionary action and terror were one and
the same” for the PSR (p. 57). At the
outset of the 1905 Revolution, the use of terrorism became the divisive issue
between SRs and SDs since terrorism “had absolutely no connection with the work
of the masses” and weakened the revolution rather than the enemy, in the eyes
of SDs (p. 59).
Theoretical beliefs further divided
the PSR from SDs, as well as the SR movement itself. The PSR did not “stand on the traditional
dogmas of Marxism” (p. 95). Chernov, in
his writings, blended Marxism and the prevailing ideals of socialism of the
early 20th century. Many felt
he focused too much emphasis on economics and too little on social
aspects. Hildermeier defends Chernov and
the SRs, stating that “Russia’s socio-economic and political condition at the
turn of the century increasingly undermined the foundation of populist theory”
and thus populist politics (p. 97). The
SRs had run into a reality in which the construction of agrarian communes would
mean “working against an economic development already in progress.”
Hildermeier’s third chapter focuses
on PSR party organization, foreign party organization issues and the initiation
of agitation in Russia. The party
established a large printing and propaganda endeavor to agitate factory workers
to action, despite the constant Okhrana presence. The PSR struggled to establish a stronghold
or even a presence in central and northern Russia’s industrial sectors. SRs were gaining strength in Russia’s south, however. The PSR struggled with the establishment of a
centralized leadership and elections due to police presence and internal
disjuncture. The PSR worked hard to
attract university students to its cause.
However, the PSR and SRs in general failed to unite the intelligentsia
with the masses. Peasants were not
cooperating in rebellion. In a sign of
their detachment from the revolution, they believed that “everything would be
better ‘when the tsar knew how badly’ they lived” (p. 109). Finally, PSR’s foreign organizations were
simply out of touch with the issues transpiring in Russia by 1905. The party itself had two centers of control. Moreover, it failed to pull peasants to its
sphere, as peasants turned out in relatively large numbers to support the Duma
elections.
By 1905, the PSR was torn by a
maximalist (agrarian) faction and PSR’s political center. The radical agrarian faction called for
terrorist action (as well as terrorist action by factory workers against
managers) while the center believed that the party should provide order and the
organization of a revolutionary movement.
Moreover, terrorist attacks, PSR moderates believed, would discredit the
party. More appropriate actions included
boycotts, strikes and mutual resistance short of violence. Radical PSR members sought to encourage peasants
to commit “economic terrorism” against noble landowners, while moderates
believed that this “spontaneity” would lead to a incongruous movement.
A further schism was created between
the intelligentsia and the leadership, as new recruits were kept outside the
party decision-making circle. The PSR
experienced “the increasing dominance of the younger party members by a new
type of strong willed, much more radical and anti-intellectual revolutionary” (p.
121). A Moscow wing of the party led by
Mazurin formed its own organization based on the original PSR.
SRs failed at the grass roots
level. Local oblast committees were
often overwhelmed, forced to cover numerous regions with few resources or personnel. Russia’s regions, especially across the Urals
and Siberia, were simply too vast and its peoples too ill-informed of the
intelligentsia’s revolutionary fervor.
Party resources were squandered and mismanaged, draining the treasures
of local organizations. Moreover,
Hildermeier’s recurring theme of the vast space between the masses and
intelligentsia/party elite permeated Russia well after the 1905
Revolution. A major “chasm separating
the working masses from the party bosses” was evident (p. 247).
Hildermeier concludes, essentially,
that the leadership of not only the PSR, but most major organizations committed
to change during Russia’s revolutionary period, simply did not understand
peasant culture. The PSR could not deal
with the phenomena of emerging private ownership in Russia. The PSR failed to connect with not only the
peasantry and agricultural sector, but also the working class and the young
intelligentsia emerging just a few years prior to the Great War. The party itself continually faced new internal
ideological factions, it shunned organization, and eventually found itself to
be a foreigner within the new realities of contemporary Russia. Ultimately, Hildermeirer’s final sentence
speaks to the failure of the populist movement as well as the socialist
movement, acting as a sort of exonerating requiem for the PSR. He states: “This impossibility of integrating
the city and the countryside constituted a fundamental dilemma of the Russian
Revolution, which can be held as the main cause of the failure of both Populism
and the experiment of a socialist society” (p. 343).
Hildermeier’s book is an
encyclopedia of information on the PSR and the SR movement in Russia prior to
the Great War. His research covers,
seemingly, every possible factual piece of information that may allude to the
failure of the SR movement, even detailing the Azef Affair that shook the moral
foundation of the PSR and the neo-populist movement. His coverage of peasant isolation and lack of
unity across the immeasurable Russian countryside as well as his detailed
exploration of the personalities and theoretical underpinnings of major and
minor party leaders is astounding.
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